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## Who should invest in specific training?

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**Abstract** We study experimentally whether employers or workers should invest in specific training. Workers have an alternative trading opportunity that takes the form of either an outside option or a threat point. Theory predicts that with outside options, employers have (weakly) better investment incentives than workers do and should therefore be the investing party. With threat points, employers and workers are predicted to invest the same. Our results are, by and large, in line with these predictions. Due to offsetting inefficiencies in the bargaining stage, however, realized inefficiencies are remarkably similar across the different situations considered.

**Keywords** Specific training · Investments · Experiments

**JEL classification** J41 · J24 · C91

### 1 Introduction

This paper presents an experimental analysis of investments in specific training. More precisely, it addresses the question which party—either employer or worker—should invest in such training from an efficiency point of view. We will use the term specific training to refer to all types of training that create a rent that can be shared between the worker and the current firm. Traditionally, specific training has been interpreted as training that enhances skills that are only useful with the current employer, i.e., as training that is specific in a technological sense. As Stevens (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,b) have made explicit, however, the creation of a rent and, hence, the specificity of training may also be due to market imperfections. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,b) argue that market imperfections such as monopsony power, asymmetric information, unions, and minimum wages may drive a wedge between the worker's productivity inside the firm and his outside options, and that this wedge may be increasing in the workers' skill level.

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Under such circumstances, training that is general in a technological sense is specific in an economic sense.<sup>1</sup> We use the term specific training to refer to this latter (broader) concept.<sup>2</sup>

When training is completely general in an economic sense, Becker's (1962) result that workers should bear the costs of such training still applies. In a competitive labor market, workers will always be able to reap the full marginal product of general training. Anticipating this, employers will not invest in such training. When training is not completely general (in an economic sense), however, there is no competitive market for trained workers. In that case, the training firm and the worker are likely to share the additional surplus created by the investment in specific skills. The costs should therefore also be shared between the employer and the worker. Only when costs are shared proportional to the benefits will investments in specific training be efficient (cf. Hashimoto 1981).

Explicit cost sharing assumes that investments are contractible. Typically, however, investments in training are not verifiable for a third party like a court.<sup>3</sup> In that case, training investments are noncontractible and explicit formal cost sharing becomes cumbersome if not impossible. Assuming that both parties have access to the same training technology, it is still possible for the employer and the worker to jointly invest in training in a noncooperative way. Parties' *marginal* investment incentives are in that case, however, distorted. Each party bears the full marginal costs of its own investment, but it cannot capture the full marginal returns of it. Theory predicts that, in equilibrium, the party that receives the largest share of the marginal return will do all the investment, whereas the other party will invest nothing (cf. Proposition 4 in Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b). Only when the employer and the worker receive the same share of the marginal return may they both invest in equilibrium. However, in that case, their joint investment is equal to the amount each party would invest in isolation (i.e., if it were the only investing party).<sup>4</sup>

The above discussion implies that in the presence of a (potential) holdup problem, the party that is predicted to receive the largest share of the marginal returns should do all the investment in training from an efficiency point of view.<sup>5</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> Note that training that is specific in a technological sense is necessarily specific in an economic sense.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that Becker (1962) already recognized this distinction between specificity in a technological and an economic sense (cf. Leuven 2005).

<sup>3</sup> See also Malcomson 1999 who notes that: "...investments may be too complex or too multidimensional for a court to verify whether they have been carried out as specified in a contract. Although it may, for example, be feasible to specify the number of hours of specific training unambiguously, specifying the quality of training during those hours is more problematic."

<sup>4</sup> We formally prove these predictions for the setting that we consider in our experiment in Appendix B, which is available at the first author's web site: <http://www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/oosterbeek/main.htm>. The model analyzed in that appendix is almost identical to the one analyzed in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b, Section II.D). While the title of their paper refers to general training, they in fact analyze training that is specific in an economic sense.

<sup>5</sup> The theoretical literature proposes several contractual solutions to the holdup problem. But as Malcomson (1999, p. 2333) notes: "None of the contracts discussed here for inducing efficient specific investments by both parties thus seems unproblematic when applied to labor markets. This suggests a powerful case for, wherever possible, *all* the specific investments to be carried out by either the firm or the employee...." This provides an additional justification for our focus on settings in which only one of the parties invests.

this paper, we investigate this prescription by means of a series of laboratory experiments. We consider a setting in which explicit cost sharing is not possible. Like in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a), it is assumed that either the employer or the worker decides how much to invest in specific training and bears the full costs of it. After the investor has chosen the investment level, the employer and the worker bargain over the division of the surplus created by the investment. The bargaining stage is affected by the parties' alternative trading opportunities. Employers' alternative trading opportunities are normalized to 0. A worker's alternative opportunity consists of working for a different employer at a given outside wage.

The theoretical literature models alternative trading opportunities in bargaining situations in two ways. First, they have been modeled as *outside options*. The underlying assumption is that the worker can unilaterally quit the bargaining with the original employer to take up an alternative employment opportunity. If the worker opts out, he cannot return to the bargaining with his original employer. If alternative opportunities take this form, the so-called *outside option principle* applies. In equilibrium, the worker gets the best of his outside option and the wage (bargaining share) he would obtain in the absence of outside options. The outside option thus acts as a lower bound on the equilibrium wage.

Second, the worker's alternative opportunity can be modeled as a *threat point*. The underlying assumption is, then, that the worker obtains his outside wage during the bargaining stage as long as agreement has not been reached. Threat point payoffs are thus collected while bargaining continues. In this case, the equilibrium bargaining division equals the Nash bargaining solution, with the disagreement (status quo) payoffs equal to the values of the alternative opportunities.

Theoretical models of wage bargaining have incorporated workers' alternative employment opportunities in either way. McDonald and Solow (1981) and Grout (1984), for instance, have modeled them as threat points, while, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson (1993b) and Kessler and Lülfsmann (2000) have incorporated them as outside options. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) consider both formulations. Which specification is the more relevant one in reality is not always easy to determine and depends on the situation considered. According to Malcomson (1997), the threat point specification is appropriate when the labor market operates frictionless (*no-friction case*), while the outside option formulation applies in case there are costs involved when switching trading partners (*turnover costs case*). Chiu and Yang (1999) formalize this distinction in terms of market frictions/rigidity. They consider an alternating-offer bargaining framework in which the length of commitment ( $T$ ) of the alternative trading opportunity is introduced as a parameter. Threat points and outside options then arise as the two limit cases where  $T \rightarrow 1$  and  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , respectively. That is, if the minimum time period for which the worker has to stick to an outside employer before he can return to the bargaining with his original employer goes to one bargaining round, alternative trading opportunities act as threat points. In the opposite case where this minimum time period approaches infinity, they act as outside options.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Alternative trading possibilities are thus *less* powerful when they are *more* rigid. The intuition is that the benefits of choosing the alternative opportunity are twofold: the worker not only receives the outside wage but also obtains the option of returning to the original employer. The value of the latter option is decreasing in  $T$ .

The distinction can more generally be made on the basis of turnover costs (see Malcomson 1997, p. 1928). When, for instance, the worker's search and relocation costs associated with finding an equally good alternative job are high, the worker is only willing to incur these costs if the outside job is permanent. Taking up such a job effectively ends the current employment and thus acts as an outside option. Temporary nearby jobs that are easily found and readily available are better characterized as threat points though. As an alternative interpretation, within labor union–firm bargaining, threat points are the payoffs the union and the firm would respectively receive in the event of a strike or a lockout. They thus represent insider factors in bargaining. The outside options reflect the parties' alternative market opportunities, i.e., outside market conditions. In a study of the UK manufacturing industry, Scaramozzino (1991) finds empirical evidence in line with this interpretation. The industry-wide (i.e., outside) wage level only affects wage levels within a firm when it is binding, whereas profits per employee (an insider factor) only do so when outside wages are nonbinding.

In the experiment, we consider both forms of alternative opportunities. We thus consider two different bargaining games: the outside option (OO) bargaining game and the threat point (TP) bargaining game. The experiment also looks at both the case where the employer invests and the one in which the worker invests. The main focus is on the comparison of investment levels of employers and workers for a given bargaining game.<sup>7</sup> In particular, given external market conditions (i.e., no frictions or turnover costs), we investigate whether employers or workers should make the specific investment from an efficiency point of view.

Both bargaining games can be regarded as simplified or reduced forms of more complicated bargaining settings. The labor market imperfections, which turn training that is general in a technological sense into training that is specific in an economic sense—e.g., monopsony power, asymmetric information, unions, and minimum wages—are factors that may influence the bargaining stage. It is not obvious how the respective labor market imperfections exactly feed into the bargaining. A more structural model of the bargaining situation including these factors would shed light on this and could educate us as to whether the threat point game or the outside option game is the more appropriate simplification. The analysis required to derive these results is beyond the scope of the present paper though. In Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), only the threat point game is considered for the bargaining stage. They thus implicitly assume that this game is the appropriate reduced form.<sup>8</sup> By considering both types of bargaining games, we allow for the possibility that the actual bargaining situation is better described by the outside option game.

<sup>7</sup> Two related papers focus on the effect of the value of alternative opportunities on the level of investment. Sloof et al. (2004) examine the situation where the noninvesting party has alternative opportunities; Sonnemans et al. (2001) consider the situation in which the investor has alternative opportunities. Some of the data used in the current paper have also been analyzed in Sonnemans et al. (2001).

<sup>8</sup> It may appear inconsistent to use the broad definition of specific training, which also includes training that is specific due to labor market imperfections, in a bargaining model with threat points, which reflect a frictionless labor market. It should be noted, however, that the labor market imperfections that may cause training to be specific do not necessarily imply that workers cannot obtain their outside wage while bargaining. The two labels of the operation of the labor market just refer to different dimensions.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-stage game that is used in our experiments. This section also summarizes the (subgame perfect) equilibrium predictions that are obtained for this model and spells out the hypotheses that are put to the test. Subsequently, Section 3 describes our experimental design. Experimental results are discussed in Section 4. The final section concludes.

## 2 The model

### 2.1 Basic setup of the model

Consider a labor relationship between an employer and a worker. Their interaction can be described as a nested bargaining game with advance production. It has the following setup (cf. Malcomson 1997; 1999):

1. *Investment stage.* Either the employer (E) or the worker (W) makes a specific investment  $I \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 100\}$ . Investment costs equal  $C(I) = I^2$  and are immediately borne by the investor.
2. *Bargaining stage.* The employer and the worker bargain over the division of the gross surplus  $R(I)$  created by the investment. Bargaining takes the form of either the OO or the TP bargaining game. The employer and the worker are assumed to have equal bargaining power. The worker's outside wage is equal to  $w \in \{w_l, w_m, w_h\} \equiv \{1800, 6800, 7800\}$ .<sup>9</sup>

Gross surplus is linear in the investment and is equal to  $R(I) = V + 100 \cdot I$ , with  $V > w$ . The latter assumption, together with  $w$  being competitive, ensures that employment at the original employer is always efficient, irrespective of the actual level of investment chosen. The net social surplus created by the investment is thus equal to  $V + 100 \cdot I - I^2$ . It follows that the efficient level of investment  $I^*$  is equal to 50.

The above description reveals that four different situations are considered, which differ by the identity of the investor and the type of bargaining game. Table 1 gives the abbreviations that we use to refer to each of these four situations. We focus in this paper on comparing the employer invests case with the worker invests case, while keeping the bargaining game fixed (either OO game or TP game). For this comparison, the exact value of  $V$  is immaterial. Occasionally, however, we will compare the results of the two different bargaining games. With these latter comparisons in mind, we have chosen the value of  $V$  with special care.

In the TP game, the worker receives the outside wage  $w$  in rounds of disagreement. The actual surplus up for renegotiation is thus equal to  $R(I) - w$ . In the OO game, the parties do not receive anything during rounds of disagreement. The

<sup>9</sup>That the outside wage  $w$  is independent of the investment reflects the assumption that the investment is fully firm specific. In the formulation of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), the outside wage is allowed to increase with the level of the investment, i.e.,  $w = w(I)$ . The key feature of their model, however, is that the difference between the worker's productivity in the current firm  $R(I)$  and the outside wage  $w(I)$  is *increasing* in the investment [i.e.,  $w'(I) < R'(I)$ ]. This feature is also present in our setup. Specifying an outside wage that increases with the investment would thus only complicate the experiment for the subjects, without adding anything of substance.

**Table 1** The four different situations considered

	Employer invests (E)	Worker invests (W)
Outside option (OO) game	E-OO	W-OO
Threat point (TP) game	E-TP	W-TP

The abbreviation used to refer to each of the four situations considered appears in each cell

actual bargaining surplus is then equal to  $R(I)$ . As a result, the *joint costs of delay* would be different in the two bargaining games if the total surplus  $R(I)$  would be the same. Existing experimental studies indicate that the frequency of disagreement is inversely correlated with the joint costs of disagreement (e.g., Ashenfelter et al. 1992; Roth 1995). In our setup, delay of agreement and ex post bargaining inefficiency would therefore most likely be much smaller under the OO game because the marginal gain of agreement is (much) higher. To facilitate a comparison of the two different bargaining stages, especially with respect to delay of agreement and (in)efficiency, we therefore have chosen  $V$  differently in the two games:  $V^{OO}=10,000$  and  $V^{TP}=10,000+w$ . With this choice of  $V$ , the joint costs of disagreement are independent of  $w$  and the same for the two bargaining games (for a given level of investment). It follows immediately from Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that under the TP game, investment incentives are unaffected by the value of  $V$ .<sup>10</sup>

The different bargaining games yield different equilibrium divisions of the surplus. As these equilibrium divisions feed back into the investment stage, equilibrium investment levels will be different for the various situations considered. The next two subsections describe this in further detail.

### 2.2 Equilibrium bargaining outcomes

In the OO game, the employer and the worker alternate in making offers about how to divide the joint surplus. If one party makes an offer, the other party can react in *three* ways: accept the offer, disagree and formulate a counteroffer in the next bargaining round, or quit the bargaining by opting out. If an offer is accepted, the employer and the worker receive payoffs according to this proposal. If there is disagreement, both parties receive nothing during the round of disagreement. If a party opts out, the employer receives nothing and the worker receives his outside wage  $w$ . After opting out, parties cannot return to the bargaining table.

In the TP game, parties also make alternating offers. The difference is that the responder can now react in only *two* ways: accept the offer or disagree and formulate a counteroffer. Opting out is not possible. If an offer is accepted, the parties receive payoffs according to the proposal. In case of disagreement, the

<sup>10</sup> Although we feel that keeping the marginal gains from agreement constant across bargaining games is the appropriate *ceteris paribus* condition (cf. Knez and Camerer 1995, p. 84), one could also argue that making the bargaining stages comparable requires the total surplus to be the same, i.e.,  $V^{OO}=V^{TP}=10,000$ . Erlei and Siemer (2004) exactly replicated our W-TP treatment, except that they chose  $V^{TP}=10,000$ . (They did not consider the OO game and the employer invests case.) Their findings replicated most of our results. Most notably, investment levels were, by and large, the same (although for  $w=1,800$ , they find a slightly lower investment rate). However, in their experiments, the average length of the bargaining was longer, as one would expect given the lower joint costs of delaying agreement.

**Table 2** Equilibrium bargaining divisions

	Employer’s share	Worker’s share
OO game (DMO solution)	$R(I) - \max \{w, 12 \cdot R(I)\}$	$\max \{w, 12 \cdot R(I)\}$
TP game (STD solution)	$12 \cdot (R(I) - w)$	$12 \cdot (R(I) + w)$

Equilibrium shares are independent of the identity of the investor and only depend on the type of bargaining game

*DMO* Deal me out, *STD* split the difference

payoffs during the round of disagreement are 0 for the employer and  $w$  for the worker.

In equilibrium, agreement is reached immediately under both bargaining games. However, the equilibrium division is different. Under the OO game, the so-called *outside option principle* applies. This principle entails that the gross surplus  $R(I)$  is split evenly between the employer and the worker,<sup>11</sup> unless this yields the worker less than his outside wage. In that case, the worker just obtains a share of the surplus equal to  $w$ , while the employer gets the remaining part  $R(I)-w$ . The outside wage  $w$  thus only acts as a constraint on the equilibrium division. In the words of Binmore et al. (1989), in the OO game, the equilibrium division is equal to the “deal-me-out” (DMO) solution.

The equilibrium prediction for the TP game is that the surplus in excess of the outside wage  $w$ , i.e.,  $R(I)-w$ , is split evenly. On top of that, the worker obtains his outside wage  $w$ . Binmore et al. refer to this equilibrium outcome as the “split-the-difference” (STD) solution.<sup>12</sup>

The equilibrium predictions under the two bargaining games are summarized in Table 2. In the TP game, neither party ever becomes residual claimant. Neither of them thus obtains the incentives to invest efficiently. In contrast, when  $w > \frac{1}{2} R(I)$  under the OO game, the employer gets the whole surplus over and above the outside wage  $w$ . In that case, the employer gets the full (marginal) return on investment and has the right incentives to invest. The worker never becomes residual claimant under the OO game.

### 2.3 Equilibrium investment levels

Anticipating the equilibrium shares in Table 2, the investor invests the amount that maximizes his net payoffs. The equilibrium investment level depends on the identity of the investor and on the bargaining game that applies. Table 3 presents the predicted investment levels in the four situations.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The equal split follows from our assumption of equal bargaining power.

<sup>12</sup> Owing to our specification of  $R(I)=10,000+w+100 \cdot I$  under the TP game, we found that the employer always receives  $5,000+50 \cdot I$  according to STD. The amount the employer receives in equilibrium is thus independent of  $w$ .

<sup>13</sup> The row corresponding to “all” just reflects the average over the three different values of  $w$ . It can be shown that in an alternative model with exogenous uncertainty, in which the true value of  $w$  becomes publicly known only *after* the investment is made (and in which the three values of  $w$  have ex ante equal probabilities), the equilibrium investment levels are as follows: 36 under E-OO, 813 under W-OO, and 25 under both TP situations.

**Table 3** Equilibrium investment levels

	$w$	Employer invests	Worker invests
OO game	1,800	25	25
	6,800	36	0
	7,800	50	0
	All	37	$8\frac{1}{3}$
TP game	1,800	25	25
	6,800	25	25
	7,800	25	25
	All	25	25

Parameter  $w$  represents the worker’s outside wage. The row corresponding to “All” reflects the average investment level over the three values of  $w$ . The efficient investment level is equal to 50

In the E-OO situation, three relevant ranges for the outside wage  $w$  can be distinguished. First,  $w$  can be so low that it does not put a constraint on the equilibrium division. Our choice of  $w_l=1,800$  represents this case. Second,  $w$  can be that high, such that the outside wage constraint is strictly binding and fully determines the equilibrium division. This applies for our choice of  $w_h=7,800$ . The remaining third case refers to the in-between situation where the wage  $w$  is such that the equilibrium investment level makes the outside wage exactly binding, i.e.,  $\frac{1}{2}R(I^{eq}) = w$ .  $w_m=6,800$  belongs to this range and yields an equilibrium investment level of  $I=36$ . Note that in this case, no local interior solutions exist in the relevant subranges  $I \leq 36$  and  $I > 36$ .

The above in-between situation cannot occur when the worker makes the investment. This holds because when  $\frac{1}{2}R(I) \leq w$ , the worker simply obtains his outside wage  $w$  and he gains by not investing at all, saving him the investment costs. Therefore, when the worker invests, there are just two relevant ranges for the outside wage  $w$ :  $w_l$  belongs to the first one, and both  $w_m$  and  $w_h$  belong to the second one. Note that under the OO game, the equilibrium investment of the employer (worker) is increasing (weakly decreasing) in  $w$ . Moreover, the employer always invests weakly more than the worker does.

Under the TP game, the equilibrium level of investment is independent of the outside wage. Both the employer and the worker always underinvest. Due to the assumption of equal bargaining power, they are predicted to invest the same amount in equilibrium.

It can be easily shown that, in terms of overall (in)efficiency, nothing is lost by having only one party making the investment.<sup>14</sup> Under two-sided investments, where both the employer and the worker can invest, the joint equilibrium investments never exceed the amounts invested by the employer in isolation (cf. Table 3).

### 2.4 Hypotheses

Equilibrium predictions based on subgame perfection are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Our focus is on which party should make the investment from an efficiency

<sup>14</sup> This is formally derived in Appendix B, which is available at the first author’s web site: <http://www.1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/oosterbeek/main.htm>.



point of view. We are therefore mainly interested in comparing, for a given bargaining game, the situation in which the employer invests with the one in which the worker does so. The corresponding hypotheses are summarized below.

The predictions concerning investment levels are guided by those regarding bargaining outcomes. We therefore also want to test these latter predictions. In particular, we want to relate the different investment levels of the employer and the worker to the returns they (are predicted to) obtain on their investment. Under both bargaining games, it is predicted that agreement is reached immediately. However, the equilibrium division of the surplus agreed upon and, thus, the return on investment, differ. In practice, substantial delays in reaching agreement may be observed, as well as large deviations from the predicted divisions. This may have an (additional) adverse effect on efficiency. For a final judgement of who should make the investment, a comparison of overall efficiency levels is therefore needed. In sum, we obtain the following three hypotheses:

#### INV

*Investment levels.* (a) Under the OO game, the employer (weakly) invests more than the worker for any value of the outside wage. (b) Under the TP game, investment levels are independent of the identity of the investor.

#### BAR

*Bargaining outcomes.* (a) When the outside option of the worker is binding under the OO game, the employer gets a larger return on his investment than the worker does. (b) In case the outside option of the worker is nonbinding, the employer and the worker get an equal return on their investment. (c) The latter also applies under the TP game.

#### EFF

*Efficiency.* (a) Under the OO game, overall efficiency losses (from investments and bargaining) are smaller when the employer invests than when the worker invests. (b) Under the TP game, overall efficiency losses are independent of the identity of the investor.

### 3 Experimental design

The experiments cover the four situations in Table 1. We ran two sessions per investor–bargaining game combination, giving eight sessions in total. Overall, 160 subjects participated, with 20 participants per session. The subject pool was the undergraduate student population of the University of Amsterdam. Most of them were students in economics. They earned on average €27 in about 2 1/2 h.

In each session, subjects played the two-stage game described in the previous section 18 times (periods) in a row. Half of the subjects performed the role of employer, and the other half were assigned the role of worker. Subjects kept the same role during the whole session. To rule out reputational considerations, subjects were, in each period, anonymously paired, using a rotation scheme for the first nine periods and a different one for the last nine periods. The experiment was computerized. The instructions and the experiment were phrased neutrally.

Like in Binmore et al. (1998), the three different values of the outside wage  $w$  were considered within each session.<sup>15</sup> In each session, we used the same ordering of  $w$  values over the 18 periods. Each of the three values of  $w$  occurred three times in the first block of nine periods and three times in the second block of nine periods. Subjects were told how the ordering was generated (each of the three values of  $w$  had an equal chance of  $\frac{1}{3}$  in each period) but were not told ex ante what this ordering was. At the beginning of each period, they were informed about the relevant value of  $w$ .

We provided subjects with an initial endowment. Employers received 60,000 points at the beginning of the experiment, whereas workers received 10,000 points. The conversion rate was €1 for 5,500 points. Endowments were used to provide investors with funds to invest in the first periods. Asymmetric endowments were needed to equalize at least somewhat the unequal (equilibrium) payoffs employers and workers obtain in the game. Actual endowments were chosen such that, over all four treatments, employers and workers theoretically would earn about the same.

The bargaining stage was framed as a finite-horizon, multiple-pie, alternating-offer bargaining game in which one pie vanishes in each round of disagreement.<sup>16</sup> The employer always made the first offer and, thus, could formulate the proposal in all odd rounds. Bargaining lasted for exactly 10 rounds. The gross surplus  $R(I)$  and the outside wage  $w$  were spread evenly over these 10 rounds. Hence, in each round, a pie of  $R(I)/10$  was to be divided between the employer and the worker. As soon as agreement was reached, all remaining pies, including the one of the current round, were divided according to the proposal agreed upon and the period ended. In the TP game, the worker received  $w/10$  for every round that agreement was postponed, while the employer received nothing during rounds of disagreement. Postponement of agreement in round 10 ended the bargaining stage. In the OO game, both parties received nothing during a round of disagreement. Here, opting out in round  $t$  resulted in a payoff of  $(11 - t) \cdot w/10$  for the worker and 0 for the employer and ended the bargaining stage.

Finally, we discuss the framing of the investment stage. At the beginning of each period, subjects were informed about both the size of the initial (per bargaining round) pie  $V/10$  and the value of the outside wage  $w/10$ . (Recall that  $V$  differs between the OO game and the TP game.) Then, investors were asked how much they wanted to add to the initial pie size. Effectively, they chose the amount  $10 \cdot I (= 100 \cdot I/10)$  at costs  $I^2$ . The size of the actual (per bargaining round) pies

<sup>15</sup> A potential disadvantage of our design might be that variations in  $w$  theoretically do not affect investment levels under TP. However, by confronting the same subjects with different values of  $w$ , we may have created the impression that subjects are expected to change their behavior. It is, however, a priori far from clear in what direction investors should change their behavior, and our experimental results confirm this.

<sup>16</sup> Our bargaining game thus differs from a setup similar to that of Rubinstein (1982) in which there is a *single* pie that shrinks over time at a constant rate (due to discounting when agreement is delayed). In practice, bargaining over wages in an employer–worker relationship typically concerns the division of a stream of future payoffs, instead of the division of a single once-and-for-all payoff that is obtained immediately when agreement is reached. The multiple-pie framework nicely takes account of this aspect (cf. Manzini 1998). In Sloof (2005), it is shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of the OO game and the TP game employed here equal the equilibrium divisions spelled out in Table 2.

was then set at the sum of the initial pie and the amount added. Subsequently, subjects bargained over the division of the 10 actual pies as described above.

## 4 Results

The presentation of our findings follows the three hypotheses formulated in Section 2.4. In three subsections, we deal with investment levels, bargaining outcomes, and efficiency, respectively. Observed investment levels did not vary significantly between the different sessions of the same investor–bargaining game situation.<sup>17</sup> We have therefore pooled the observations from sessions that consider the same treatment.

### 4.1 Investment levels

Our first result relates to hypothesis INV and compares employers' investments with workers' investments.

**Result 1.** (a) Under the OO game, the employer invests significantly more than the worker does when the outside wage is intermediate or high ( $w=6,800$  or  $w=7,800$ ) but not when the outside wage is low ( $w=1,800$ ). (b) Under the TP game, the worker invests significantly more than the employer does when the outside wage is high ( $w=7,800$ ) but not when the outside wage is low or intermediate ( $w=1,800$  or  $w=6,800$ ).

Evidence supporting Result 1 is provided in Table 4, which reports average investment levels by treatment. Statistical tests are based on the average investment levels of individual investors (rather than on separate investment decisions).<sup>18</sup> In four out of eight cases, average investment levels of employers differ significantly from those of workers. Under the OO game, employers typically invest significantly more than workers do. Only when  $w=1,800$ , such that the outside wage never binds, is the observed difference not significant at the 5% level. For the TP game, an opposite conclusion holds. There, employers and workers typically invest about the same: differences are insignificant for the low and intermediate outside wages. Only when  $w=7,800$  did workers invest significantly more than employers. In all treatments, average investment levels are below the efficient level.

To make sure that our conclusions are not biased due to ignoring learning effects, we also analyzed the data from the last nine and the final three periods separately. A full discussion can be found in Appendix A. The results reported there indicate that Result 1 is not contaminated by learning effects.

An observation that is not incorporated in Result 1 is that there is quite some heterogeneity in individual investment behavior. The standard deviations reported in Table 4 already indicate this. More detailed information regarding individual

<sup>17</sup> Twelve Mann–Whitney rank sum tests were performed to compare mean individual investment levels conditional on the value of  $w$ . No significant differences between similar sessions were found at the 5% level.


<sup>18</sup> Recall that for each value of  $w$ , we have six observations for each individual investor, and that for each of the four situations considered, we have 20 investors.

**Table 4** Mean investment levels by treatment

	$w$	Employer invests			Worker invests		
		Mean	SD	Pred	Mean	SD	Pred.
OO game	1,800	38.7	(11.9)	[25]	28.0	(17.2)	[25]
	6,800	37.9 <sup>a</sup>	(13.3)	[36]	21.5 <sup>a</sup>	(15.5)	[0]
	7,800	40.0 <sup>b</sup>	(14.9)	[50]	21.9 <sup>b</sup>	(15.8)	[0]
	All	38.9 <sup>c</sup>	(9.0)	[37]	23.8 <sup>c</sup>	(14.5)	[8.3]
TP game	1,800	29.9	(14.5)	[25]	30.9	(12.5)	[25]
	6,800	32.9	(12.6)	[25]	39.2	(15.5)	[25]
	7,800	32.5 <sup>d</sup>	(13.5)	[25]	43.5 <sup>d</sup>	(15.1)	[25]
	All	31.8	(12.7)	[25]	37.9	(13.3)	[25]

Superscript letters indicate significant differences at the 5% level (rank sum test;  $m=n=20$  individual investors). Standard deviations (SD) appear within parentheses, and theoretically predicted investment levels (Pred.) are within square brackets. Rows labeled “All” aggregate over the three different values of  $w$

mean investment levels is provided in Fig. 1. This figure shows the frequency distributions of individual mean investment levels (based on six investment decisions) by treatment. The means are rounded to the nearest multiple of 10. For each treatment, we have 20 individual investors. A fraction of 0.1 thus corresponds to two investors, etc. The figure confirms that there is quite some dispersion among individual investors. Take, for instance, the W-OO situation for which theory predicts that workers do not invest at all for high outside wages. In practice, only 3 out of the 20 workers consistently choose such low investment levels (for both  $w=6,800$  and  $w=7,800$ ). At the same time, there are some other investors who, on average, choose the efficient level of 50 in these treatments.



**Fig. 1** Frequency distributions of individual mean investment levels by treatment

The findings for the OO game reported in Result 1 correspond with theoretical predictions. In line with hypothesis INV(a), holdup is less severe when the employer invests than when the worker invests. The results under the TP game deviate from theoretical predictions only when the outside wage is high ( $w=7,800$ ). Here, no significant differences were expected, but in practice, workers invest significantly more than employers do. Thus, in contrast with hypothesis INV(b), the extent of the underinvestment problem under the TP game is not completely independent of the identity of the investor. Holdup is less severe when the worker invests. Finally, except for the single case where holdup is predicted not to occur (viz.,  $w=7,800$  in E-OO), average investment levels are always above the level predicted by subgame perfectness.

The finding that underinvestment is less severe than predicted (except when  $w=7,800$  in E-OO) is in line with a number of earlier experimental studies. These papers indicate that a partial solution to holdup is provided by fairness and reciprocity considerations. Here, reciprocity refers to the motivation to reward fair behavior and to punish unfair behavior, even though these rewards and punishments are costly to carry out. In a holdup context, this entails that investment is typically seen as a kind act, which is therefore rewarded by the noninvestor with a larger-than-predicted return.<sup>19</sup> The investment levels reported in Table 4 suggest that this informal mechanism is also at work here. In the next subsection, we return to this issue when we look whether the actual investment levels can be explained from actual bargaining behavior.<sup>20</sup>

We end this subsection by briefly discussing two other interesting observations that can be obtained from Table 4. First, we look at the comparative statics with respect to  $w$ , for each of the four different situations considered. Under the OO game, investment levels appear to be constant over the different values of the outside wage, irrespective of whether the employer or the worker invests.<sup>21</sup> This also holds for the E-TP situation. However, for W-TP, we observe that workers' investment levels are increasing in the outside wage  $w$ .<sup>22</sup> The observed comparative statics for the E-OO situation suggest that contractual solutions to holdup that rely on the working of the outside option principle are unlikely to solve

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., Berg et al. (1995), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a,b), Gantner et al. (2001), Hackett (1993; 1994) Königstein (2000; 2001), and Oosterbeek et al. (2003).

<sup>20</sup> Recently, some alternative behavioral theories focus on the importance of fairness and reciprocity (see Fehr and Schmidt 2002 for a comprehensive overview). These theories can only make precise predictions under strong additional assumptions (e.g., homogeneity and/or common knowledge of social preferences), but we can touch upon some indications. Fairness theories are outcome-based and predict that participants will only agree on outcomes in which both parties earn about the same. This means that the outside option will never be exercised. If both parties earn the same, the efficient investment of 50 will be optimal in all treatments. Reciprocity theories are intention-based; friendly (unfriendly) actions are rewarded (punished). If investments that are higher (lower) than the equilibrium prediction are considered friendly (unfriendly), investments will be a little more profitable for the investor. In that case, investments will be higher than the equilibrium prediction in all treatments, but the relative investment levels will stay about the same.

<sup>21</sup> Although, for the worker invests case, the means and standard deviations might suggest otherwise, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for matched pairs does not yield a significant difference between  $w=1,800$  and  $w=6,800$  and  $7,800$ , respectively. For the former,  $p=0.198$ ; for the latter,  $p=0.139$ .

<sup>22</sup> Since these comparisons are not the main focus of this paper, we have suppressed symbols indicating results from these statistical tests in Table 4.

holdup in practice. The comparative statics in  $w$  for the W-OO situation strengthen this conclusion; they also reject the predicted relationship between investment incentives and the outside option principle.<sup>23</sup>

Second, we can compare average investment levels between the two bargaining games. When the employer invests, investment levels are typically higher under the OO game than under the TP game. In case the worker makes the investment, it is exactly the other way around. These results are in line with the theoretical predictions.

## 4.2 Bargaining outcomes

The investor's actual return on investment is determined by the offers finally accepted and the actual number of bargaining rounds. In this subsection, we present results on these (and other) aspects. Our focus is on whether observed investment levels are optimal—from the selfish point of view of the investor—given the actual bargaining behavior.

Before we turn to the investment incentives induced by actual bargaining behavior, we first take a descriptive look at the actual bargaining outcomes. These are also briefly compared with the outcomes found in previous bargaining experiments. Subsequently, we turn to the evaluation of hypothesis BAR; that is, we compare the actual returns on investment with the predicted ones. At the end of this subsection, we then establish whether actual investments can be considered optimal given observed bargaining outcomes.

*Descriptive analysis of bargaining outcomes* When the bargaining stage starts, investment costs are sunk. Subgame perfection then predicts that the bargaining outcome is independent of the identity of the investor. In case the OO game applies, it is predicted that the parties immediately agree on the DMO outcome. Under the TP game, the predicted division is equal to the STD solution (cf. Table 2). In practice, however, fairness considerations are likely to play an important role. Camerer (2003, p. 196) summarizes the results of a large number of (alternating-offer) bargaining experiments and concludes that: “[G]enerally, players deviate from (perfect) equilibrium predictions in the direction of equal splits....” Besides DMO and STD, we therefore consider the equal split (ES) division, in which the employer and the worker both receive half of the gross surplus  $R(I)$ , to be a relevant benchmark as well.

Table 5 provides an overview of the actual bargaining outcomes by comparing the (means of the) employers' first offers and the finally accepted offers with the three relevant benchmarks. The term offer always refers to the amount the employer gets. For the OO game, we make a distinction between the cases in which the outside wage is binding [i.e.,  $w > \frac{1}{2}R(I)$ ] and the ones where it is not. In the former, the predicted DMO share for the employer is equal to  $R(I) - w$ , while in the latter cases, DMO corresponds with the ES division  $\frac{1}{2}R(I)$ .

<sup>23</sup> The experiments reported in Sloof et al. (2004) provide an explanation for these findings. There, it is found that a self-serving bias induces investors to overlook the difference between a binding and a nonbinding outside option when making their investment decision.

**Table 5** Mean bargaining outcomes in relation to three relevant benchmarks

	Employer invests							Worker invests						
	Offer (1)	STD (2)	DMO (3)	ES (4)	Off./R(I) (5)	Off./Pred. (6)	n (7)	Offer (1)	STD (2)	DMO (3)	ES (4)	Off./R(I) (5)	Off./Pred. (6)	n (7)
OO binding	First	523	283	566	658	0.39	149	398	217	435	586	0.33	0.94	206
	Acc.	490	285	571	660	0.37	125	363	219	437	587	0.30	0.84	168
OOnonbinding	First	813	518	720	720	0.56	211	643	517	663	663	0.49	0.98	154
	Acc.	711	525	719	719	0.49	196	575	518	663	663	0.44	0.88	147
TP game	First	903	659	932	932	0.49	360	842	689	963	963	0.44	1.22	360
	Acc.	788	659	933	933	0.42	356	767	690	963	963	0.40	1.12	354

Columns labeled “(1)” report mean first offers (in rows labeled “First”) and mean accepted offers (in rows labeled “Acc.”), respectively; “offer” always refers to the amount the employer gets. Columns (2) through (4) report the average values of the three relevant theoretical benchmarks DMO (predicted outcome under OO game, cf. Table 2), STD (predicted outcome under TP game, cf. Table 2), and ES [equal split, i.e.,  $R(I)/2$ ]. Columns labeled “(5)” give the mean actual offers as share of the gross surplus, whereas columns labeled “(6)” give the mean actual offers as share of the predicted offers. Columns labeled “(7)” report the number of observations  $n$  on which the averages are based. The rows labeled “OO binding” pertain to the OO game with a binding outside wage (i.e.,  $w > R(I)/2$ ), and the rows labeled “OO nonbinding” pertain to the OO game when the wage is nonbinding [i.e.,  $w < R(I)/2$ ].

Table 5 is divided into two panels: the left one considers the case where the employer made the investment, and the right-hand panel gives the case where the worker invested. The two panels have exactly the same setup. The columns labeled “Offer” report the means of the first offers (in rows labeled “First”) and the finally accepted offers (in rows labeled “Acc.”), respectively. The next three columns give the values of the three relevant benchmarks. In the OO binding situation, it holds that  $STD < DMO < ES$ , while in the other two bargaining situations, we have  $STD < DMO = ES$ . The fifth columns express the (means of) actual offers as share of the gross surplus whereas the two columns labeled “(6)” give the actual offers as share of the predicted offer. The last columns give the number of observations.

In the OO binding situation, mean first offers are below the mean DMO prediction. Employers are thus typically prepared to give workers somewhat more than their outside wage. This can be interpreted as some minimum amount needed to make the worker prefer the employer’s first offer over his outside wage. The finally agreed offers are somewhat below the first offers.<sup>24</sup> However, these finally agreed offers remain much closer to the predicted DMO outcome than to the STD outcome.

In the OO nonbinding situation, the DMO prediction coincides with the ES division. Mean first offers are much closer to DMO than to STD. This also holds for finally agreed offers when the employer made the investment. In case the worker invested, finally accepted offers are in between the DMO and STD outcomes. In the TP game, the difference between the ES division and the STD prediction is the largest. On average, employers’ first offers are well above the STD division and more in line with the DMO outcome of an equal split. This suggests that employers are not prepared to let workers fully exploit their advantageous bargaining position. Finally agreed offers are much more in line with the STD prediction, especially in the worker invests case.

*Comparison with previous experimental studies* The findings reported above are in line with earlier alternating-offer bargaining experiments (without an investment stage). Binmore et al. (1989) consider an outside option bargaining game for three different values of the outside option. The surplus up for division was equal to £7, while the outside option of the worker (their player 2) equaled either £0, £2, or £4, respectively. The first two outside option values are nonbinding, whereas the outside option of £4 is binding. Binmore et al. (1989, p. 756) conclude that in the treatments with outside option values equal to £2 and £4, “[D]eal-me-out predicted the outcomes overwhelmingly better than split-the-difference.”<sup>25</sup> This conclusion is largely in line with our findings. Binmore et al. also find that the observed comparative statics are in line with the outside option principle: the share of the available pie finally obtained by the worker is equal for the £0 and £2 treatments where the outside option is nonbinding (and typically equal to the predicted equal

<sup>24</sup>The finding that accepted offers are, on average, below first offers is not surprising. In our setup, the employer always makes the first offer and offers are expressed as the amount the employer obtains. If the worker accepts the first offer, the finally agreed offer equals the first offer. If not, it is likely that the worker does so in anticipation of either a higher total or a higher relative payoff. In both cases, the finally agreed offer must be lower than the first offer.

<sup>25</sup>Note that for an outside option value of £0, these two outcomes are identical.



split) but significantly higher when the outside option is binding (i.e., equals £4).<sup>26</sup> The fractions reported in columns (5) of Table 5 replicate these results.

The experiments reported in Binmore et al. (1991) are based on a 2×2 design. For both the outside option and the threat point bargaining game, they consider two outside wage values, viz., £1.8 and £3.2, with a pie of £5 up for division. For the outside option game, DMO again predicts the actual outcomes better than STD. Moreover, comparative statics are again in line with the outside option principle; the worker obtains a significantly larger share when the outside option is binding (£3.2). In the threat point game with a high threat point value of £3.2, the outcomes are well in line with the predicted STD solution. For the low threat point value, actual outcomes are in between the DMO and STD solutions, just like what we observed.<sup>27</sup> Comparing the two different bargaining games, final outcomes differ significantly when the outside option is high (£3.2) and less so when it is low (£1.8).<sup>28</sup> Thus, subjects do, in general, recognize the (subtle) difference between threat points and outside options in alternating-offer bargaining games.

*Evaluation of hypothesis BAR* After having described the actual bargaining outcomes, we next want to establish how the actual divisions agreed upon affect the investor's investment incentives. Unlike what the theory predicts, Table 5 indicates that the bargaining outcome depends on the identity of the investor. Especially under OO nonbinding and under the TP game, the employer gets a larger share of the gross surplus when he made the investment. This suggests that the actual returns on investment differ from the predicted ones. Even then, the *relative* investment incentives of the worker and the employer may be unaffected. Our next result relates to this.

**Result 2.** (a) *When the worker's outside option is binding under the OO game, the finally accepted offers yield a larger private return on investment when the employer invests than when the worker invests.* (b) *In case the outside option is nonbinding, finally accepted offers give a private return on investment that is independent of the investor's identity.* (c) *The latter also applies under the TP game.*

Result 2 follows from the regression results reported in Table 6. Here, we have regressed the amount the investor receives according to the finally accepted offer on the base amount  $V$ , the level of investment  $I$ , and the outside wage  $w$ . To determine whether the identity of the investor matters, we have also included interaction terms with the dummy variable  $D_w$ . This dummy equals 1 when the worker makes the investment and 0 otherwise. Time trend  $t$  controls for potential learning effects. Observations in which the worker opted out under the OO game

<sup>26</sup> Binmore et al. (2002), Kahn and Murnighan (1993), and Knez and Camerer (1995) also obtained experimental evidence that showed that the worker's final payoff did not rise one-to-one with his outside option.

<sup>27</sup> Because we chose  $V^{TP}=10,000+w$ , our setup corresponds with the low threat point payoff in Binmore et al. (1991, Figs. 3 and 4) where the threat point value is less than half of the overall surplus. Oosterbeek et al. (2003) also consider a threat point bargaining game treatment in which the pie up for division is exogenously fixed and find that, in their setup, STD predicts the actual bargaining outcomes better than the DMO or ES outcome does.

<sup>28</sup> For the £5 cake, the latter result may be due to round number focal point effects. Binmore et al. (1991) therefore also consider a larger cake size (\$11), and there, sharper differences between the two bargaining games are obtained.

**Table 6** Regressions explaining investors' finally accepted shares

	OO binding	OO nonbinding	TP game
<i>V</i>	0.850 [1] (0.084)**	0.549 [0.5] (0.028)**	0.436 [0.5] (0.020)**
<i>V</i> : <i>D</i> <sub>W</sub>	-0.770 [-1] (0.095)**	-0.036 [0] (0.026)	0.127 [0] (0.026)**
<i>I</i>	0.852 [1] (0.070)**	0.719 [0.5] (0.074)**	0.653 [0.5] (0.044)**
<i>I</i> : <i>D</i> <sub>W</sub>	-0.613 [-1] (0.079)**	-0.016 [0] (0.083)	0.039 [0] (0.104)
<i>w</i>	-0.825 [-1] (0.111)**	-0.335 [0] (0.046)**	-0.164 [-0.5] (0.038)**
<i>w</i> : <i>D</i> <sub>W</sub>	1.78 [2] (0.129)**	0.439 [0] (0.055)**	0.221 [1] (0.042)
<i>t</i>	-1.47 [0] (1.03)	-2.46 [0] (1.19)*	-0.507 [0] (0.894)
<i>n</i>	293	343	710
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.910	0.666	0.988

In each regression, the dependent variable is the amount the investor gets according to the finally accepted offer. Regressors are the base amount *V*, the level of investment *I*, the outside wage *w*, a time trend *t*, and interaction terms based on dummy variable *D*<sub>W</sub>, which equals 1 only when the worker makes the investment. For the OO game, there are separate regressions for the case where the outside wage is binding [i.e.,  $w > R(I)/2$ ] and the case where it is not. Numbers within square brackets refer to the predicted coefficients. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) take account of correlated disturbance terms of multiple observations per subject

\*Significant coefficients at the 5% level; \*\*significant coefficients at the 1% level

(84 observations) and in which no agreement was reached in the TP game (10 cases) are left out. For the OO game, the regressions have been estimated separately for the case where the outside wage is binding [ $w > \frac{1}{2}R(I)$ ] and the case where it is not. Because the regressions are based on multiple observations per subject, we calculated robust standard errors that take this into account.

The estimated coefficients for the level of investment are of particular interest. In the OO binding situation, the employer is predicted to be the residual claimant.<sup>29</sup> This is apparently not the case because the estimated coefficient on *I* is significantly below 1 (0.852) and also exceeds the coefficient on *I*:*D*<sub>W</sub> in absolute value (0.852 > 0.613). When the employer invests, he thus gets about 85% of the marginal return on his investment, where a 100% return is predicted. The worker still gets about 25% of the marginal return on his own investment (0.852 - 0.613 = 0.239). Here, a 0 return is predicted. However, in line with theoretical predictions, finally accepted offers give the employer a substantially larger (marginal) private return on his investment than the worker gets if he is the investor; the coefficient on *I*:*D*<sub>W</sub> is significantly negative in this case.

Under both the OO game with a nonbinding outside wage and the TP game, it is predicted that the finally agreed offer gives the investor half of the return on his investment. This is not exactly the case though. In the second and third columns of Table 5, the estimated coefficients for *I* exceed one half. The investor gets a return of about 65–70% on investment. But as theory predicts, the employer and the worker get an equal return; the coefficients on *I*:*D*<sub>W</sub> are not significantly different from 0 in both cases. For the W-TP situation with *V*=10,000 (instead of 10,000+*w*

<sup>29</sup> Formally, the DMO and STD predictions within square brackets do not exactly apply for proposals made by the worker. Specifically, these two predictions have to be multiplied by  $(9 - t)(10 - t)$  to obtain the worker's equilibrium proposal in even round *t* (cf. Sloof 2005). Out of the 1,346 interactions that finally ended in agreement, 400 (29.7%) were concluded upon in an even bargaining round.

as in our case), Erlei and Siemer (2004; Table 6) obtain almost exactly the same return on investment. Their estimated coefficient on  $I$  equals 0.648.

Other interesting observations follow from Table 6.<sup>30</sup> When theory predicts the outside wage  $w$  to be irrelevant for the final bargaining division (OO nonbinding), it still has a significant influence. A higher outside wage then yields the worker a larger final share. When  $w$  is predicted to have a significant impact, its influence appears to be smaller than expected. For the OO binding situation, the estimated coefficient on  $w$  equals  $-0.825$  when the employer invests, while the prediction is  $-1$ . In case the worker invests, the net coefficient on  $w$  equals  $0.95$  ( $1.78 - 0.825$ ) and is not significantly different from the predicted net coefficient of  $1$ . Under the TP game, the difference is much larger. Here, the outside wage is predicted to have a substantial impact, yet its actual impact is very small. By and large, workers appear to be unable to exploit their bargaining advantage stemming from more favorable threat points. Finally, the coefficient on  $t$  reveals that some (weak) learning occurs only in the OO nonbinding situation. Here, the investors' finally accepted shares decrease during the course of the experiment. Even for this bargaining situation, however, the other coefficients are almost identical whether a time trend is included or not.

The higher-than-predicted return on investment under OO nonbinding and the TP game can be explained by positive reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior is a common finding in a large number of different experimental games (cf. Fehr and Gächter 2000). In our experiment, investing more than what is predicted can be interpreted as something that is kind and therefore warrants a larger-than-predicted return. If the investor anticipates such a reciprocal reaction, it is optimal for him to invest more than what is predicted. As noted in Section 4.1, a number of other experiments also find that investors are partly compensated for the sunk investment costs incurred.

Result 2 only considers the return on investment as it is present in the finally agreed offers. However, for the actual investment incentives, it is also important to know how long it takes to reach agreement. Our next result compares delay of agreement across treatments.

**Result 3.** (a) *Under the OO game, agreement is reached sooner when the worker invests than when the employer invests.* (b) *Under the TP game with a low outside wage ( $w=1,800$ ), agreement is also reached sooner when the worker invests. In case the outside wage is high ( $w=6,800$  or  $w=7,800$ ), there are no significant differences in delay.*

Result 3 follows from Table 7, which reports for given levels of  $w$  the percentage of cases in which agreement is reached immediately and the mean

<sup>30</sup> Instead of using the investors' finally accepted shares as independent variable, we can alternatively regress the employers' finally accepted shares on the explanatory variables of Table 6. Because the bargaining outcome is predicted to be independent of the identity of the investor, the three interaction terms are then predicted to have no effect. These regressions (not reported here) reveal that this is almost always the case for  $V \cdot D_W$  and  $w \cdot D_W$  (the single exception occurs for  $w \cdot D_W$  under OO nonbinding) but not so for  $I \cdot D_W$ . The latter interaction term is significant (5% level) in OO nonbinding and the TP game. We have chosen to report the regressions of Table 6 because they immediately reveal—through the (in)significance of the coefficient on  $I \cdot D_W$ —whether the private investment returns differ significantly between employers and workers. Clearly, the two types of regressions lead to similar conclusions.

**Table 7** Percentage of immediate agreement and mean number of rounds before agreement

	<i>w</i>	Employer invests			Worker invests		
		% Imm.	# Rnds	<i>n</i>	% Imm.	# Rnds	<i>n</i>
OO game	1,800	39.2	2.39 <sup>a</sup>	118	57.5	1.85 <sup>a</sup>	115
	6,800	51.7	1.60 <sup>b</sup>	101	72.5	1.27 <sup>b</sup>	105
	7,800	64.2	1.36 <sup>c</sup>	102	70.0	1.15 <sup>c</sup>	95
	All	51.7	1.82 <sup>d</sup>	321	66.7	1.44 <sup>d</sup>	315
TP game	1,800	35.0	2.85 <sup>e</sup>	118	46.7	2.23 <sup>e</sup>	118
	6,800	40.0	2.44	118	35.0	2.34	118
	7,800	32.5	2.49	120	37.5	2.19	118
	All	35.8	2.59	356	39.7	2.25	354

Columns labeled “% Imm.” give the percentage of cases in which agreement is reached immediately. Columns labeled “# Rnds” report the mean number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement, and the columns labeled “*n*” report the number of observations on which these averages are based. Rows labeled “All” aggregate over the three different values of *w*. Superscript letters indicate significant differences at the 5% level (rank sum test)

number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement. The columns labeled “*n*” give the numbers of observations on which the latter averages are based. These numbers differ from the maximum of 120 (360 for all) due to opting out (in the OO game) and no agreement (in the TP game).

Theory predicts that agreement is always reached immediately (in the first round) and that opting out does not occur. Actual outcomes deviate from these predictions: the percentages of immediate agreement are well below 100%, and opting out does occur. For each level of the outside wage *w*, rank sum tests on the number of bargaining rounds reveal that, under the OO game, agreement is reached significantly sooner when the worker invests than when the employer invests. The same holds for the TP game when *w*=1,800 but not when *w*=6,800 or *w*=7,800. In the latter cases, the mean number of bargaining rounds do not vary with the identity of the investor.<sup>31</sup> An explanation why, on average, agreement is reached sooner when the worker has made the investment is that the employer then demands for less in his first offer, both as share of the overall surplus and as share of the predicted outcome (cf. Table 5).

Results 2 and 3 can be used to evaluate hypothesis BAR. The first part of this hypothesis [BAR(a)] receives mixed support. Result 2(a) provides evidence in favor of the employer getting a larger return on investment in the OO binding situation; Result 3(a) provides evidence against it. Here, the employer’s larger marginal share of the final agreement and the longer delay when he invests work in opposite directions. Hypothesis BAR(b) is rejected, because the speed with which agreement is reached gives the worker a larger return on investment when the outside option is nonbinding.<sup>32</sup> The third part of hypothesis BAR receives

<sup>31</sup> Appendix A reports the average number of bargaining rounds for the last nine and final three periods separately (cf. Table 11). Average delay is typically shorter in later periods. Apparently, subjects learn to avoid costly delay. Result 3 is, however, not affected by this. It is supported when we consider only periods 10 to 18 or when we just look at the final three periods.

<sup>32</sup> The opting-out rates under E-OO (11%) and W-OO (12½ %) are fairly similar and thus do not affect the relative return on the investment in the two cases.

qualitative support. Although there is some evidence showing that when the outside wage is low, agreement is reached sooner when the worker invests [Result 3(b)]; overall, the return on the investment indeed seems fairly similar for the worker and the employer.

*“Optimum” investment levels* The mean investment levels reported in Table 4 differ substantially from the predicted levels in most treatments. However, given the (at best) mixed support for hypothesis BAR, the observed investment levels may still be optimal (from a selfish point of view), given the actual bargaining behavior. The last result of this subsection relates to this.

**Result 4.** (a) *When the outside wage is low ( $w=1,800$ ) under the OO game, the “optimum” investment level of the employer is below the worker’s optimum investment level. (b) In case the outside wage is high (6,800 or 7,800), it is the other way around. (c) Under the TP game, optimum investment levels are similar for both investors when the outside wage is low ( $w=1,800$ ), while in case  $w$  is high (6,800 or 7,800), the optimum investment level is higher for the worker.*

The estimated regression equations with the investors’ net payoffs are dependent variables, and the level of investment and investment squared are independent variables. To control for potential learning effects, we included a variable that measures the time that the investor was confronted with the particular outside wage (hence, this variable ranges from 1 to 6).<sup>33</sup> The optimum levels of investment can be directly obtained from the estimated coefficients. Table 8 reports these optimum investment levels, along with their standard errors.<sup>34</sup> In 2 out of 12 treatments, the estimated coefficient for  $I$  and  $I^2$  were both negative and insignificant, yielding an optimal investment level of 0.<sup>35</sup> This actually corresponds with the theoretical predictions for these two cases.

When  $w=1,800$  under the OO game, the selfish worker should invest more than the employer does according to our estimates of optimum investment levels. (However, note that the standard error on the worker’s estimated optimum is particularly large.) For  $w=6,800$  and  $w=7,800$ , it is exactly the other way around. When the TP game applies, the estimated optima are always larger for the worker, although the differences are very minor when the outside wage is low ( $w=1,800$ ). One potential caveat applies. In some of the cases, the estimated standard errors are rather high. This suggests that the variance in observed bargaining behavior is so large that it is of little help in determining the appropriate investment level.

Comparing Results 1 and 4, we observe that in four out of six relevant cases (i.e., bargaining game–outside wage combinations), actual bargaining behavior can explain differences between employers’ and workers’ actual investment levels. The first exception occurs when  $w=1,800$  under the OO game. In this case, the worker’s

<sup>33</sup> Except for  $w=7,800$  under W-OO and  $w=1,800$  under W-TP, these time trends were never significant (at the 5% level).

<sup>34</sup> We again calculated robust standard errors that take account of correlated disturbance terms of multiple observations per subject.

<sup>35</sup> When we use the negative coefficients to calculate the unconstrained optima, the following “optimum” investment levels are obtained (both for W-TP):  $-11.48$  when  $w=6,800$  and  $-2.40$  when  $w=7,800$ . The reported robust standard errors for these two treatments (Table 8) in fact refer to these unconstrained optima.

**Table 8** Optimum investment levels

	$w$	Employer invests		Worker invests	
OO game	1,800	28.47	(3.56)	34.43	(13.04)
	6,800	32.17	(5.23)	0	(24.50) <sup>a</sup>
	7,800	38.07	(4.28)	0	(5.46) <sup>a</sup>
TP game	1,800	23.90	(4.76)	24.28	(7.60)
	6,800	18.04	(7.68)	30.10	(3.52)
	7,800	30.25	(3.42)	35.71	(2.51)

The estimated optimal (from a selfish point of view) investment level, given the actual bargaining behavior, appears in each cell. These estimates follow from regressing the investors' net payoffs on the investment level, investment squared, and a time trend. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) correct for multiple observations per subject. In all cases,  $n=120$

<sup>a</sup> The level is set at the lower border of 0 because the estimated unconstrained optimum is negative. Reported standard errors refer to these unconstrained optima

outside option is always nonbinding. Theory then predicts that employers and workers invest the same, while actual bargaining behavior seems to indicate that workers should invest more [Result 4(a)]. This is not what we observed though. Employers invest more than workers do, albeit not significantly so [Result 1(a)]. Given the calculated optimum investment levels, we conclude that employers substantially overinvest from a selfish point of view, while workers seem to underinvest in this case.

The second exception concerns the TP game when  $w=6,800$ . From Result 4(c), we can conclude that workers should invest more in this case. We do indeed observe that workers, on average, invest more (cf. Table 4), but the difference lacks significance. Given that the differences in average observed investment levels are fairly large (and that the  $p$  values are always below 0.14), we conclude for this case that actual bargaining behavior can provide a reasonable explanation for employers' and workers' investments.

In case the outside wage is high under the OO game ( $w=6,800$  and  $w=7,800$ ), relative investment levels are in line with actual private returns. Yet, our calculations suggest that workers now substantially overinvest from a selfish point of view, whereas employers do only slightly so. These deviations are not substantive enough to alter the relative investment levels from the predicted direction; employers invest significantly more, in line with their higher optimum investment level.

Also, under the TP game, the observed differences between investment levels can partly be explained on the basis of the actual private returns on the investment. There, workers invest significantly more when the outside wage  $w$  is equal to 7,800 [Result 1(b)], in line with the ordering of the optimum investment levels presented in Table 8. The observed differences are, however, somewhat larger than one would expect on the basis of actual private returns. Both the employer and the worker seem to overinvest from a selfish point of view. A possible explanation for the observed overinvestment is the presence of self-serving biases. Both employers and workers may have a self-serving assessment of what is a fair or reasonable return on investment. Some experimental evidence showing that such self-serving biases can indeed explain overinvestment is provided by Sloof et al. (2004).

Overall, we conclude that actual private investment returns can explain observed investment patterns reasonably well.

### 4.3 Efficiency

Subgame perfection predicts that there will be no efficiency losses in the bargaining stage. Inefficiencies will be solely due to underinvestment. Our final result concerns actual inefficiency.

**Result 5.** (a) Under the OO game, investment (bargaining) inefficiencies are smaller (larger) when the employer invests than when the worker invests. Total inefficiencies are, by and large, independent of the identity of the investor. (b) Under the TP game with a high outside wage ( $w=7,800$ ), investment inefficiencies are larger when the employer invests. As a result, overall inefficiencies are somewhat smaller when the worker invests.

Table 9 presents the evidence for this result. Investment inefficiencies are calculated as the difference between the maximum net surplus of 2,500 achieved at  $I=50$  and the actual net surplus of the investment made, which is equal to  $100 \cdot I - I^2$ . Under the OO game, investment inefficiencies are always significantly smaller when the employer invests. Under the TP game with  $w=7,800$ , investment inefficiencies are larger when the employer invests. For lower values of  $w$ , the investment inefficiencies do not vary significantly with the identity of the investor.

Bargaining inefficiencies reflect our earlier findings regarding delay of agreement and opting out, which are the two sources of this type of inefficiency. Under the OO game, bargaining inefficiencies are significantly smaller when the worker invests.<sup>36</sup> Under the TP game, average bargaining inefficiencies are also smaller when the worker invests, but the observed differences are not significant at the 5% level.

Investment and bargaining inefficiency together yield total inefficiency. Interestingly, not many significant differences are observed between different investor's identities. By and large, we can conclude that, under the OO game, overall inefficiencies tend to be independent of the investor, while in case the TP game applies, overall inefficiencies are somewhat smaller when the worker invests.

Result 5 provides qualitative support for hypothesis EFF. Under the OO game, we do observe that efficiency losses due to suboptimal investment are smaller when the employer invests than when the worker invests, in line with EFF(a). However, overall observed inefficiencies are not in line with theoretical predictions. For the TP game, we indeed observed few significant differences between the two investor types. Only when  $w=7,800$  did observed inefficiencies contrast with hypothesis EFF(b). Inefficiencies are then smaller when the worker makes the investment.

<sup>36</sup> The part of the bargaining inefficiencies that can be attributed to the worker opting out (included in the bargaining inefficiencies reported in Table 9) does not vary significantly with the identity of the investor. For the E-OO situation, the average "opting-out" inefficiencies equal 129, 923, 787, and 613 for  $w_1$ ,  $w_m$ ,  $w_h$ , and all, respectively. For W-OO, they are equal to 267, 559, 882, and 570.

**Table 9** Average efficiency losses

	<i>w</i>	Employer invests			Worker invests		
		Invest.	Bargain.	Total	Invest.	Bargain.	Total
OO	1,800	429 <sup>a</sup>	2,148 <sup>e</sup>	2,577	828 <sup>a</sup>	1,545 <sup>e</sup>	2,373
	6,800	401 <sup>b</sup>	1,940 <sup>f</sup>	2,341	1,130 <sup>b</sup>	894 <sup>f</sup>	2,024
	7,800	387 <sup>c</sup>	1,441	1,828 <sup>h</sup>	1,158 <sup>c</sup>	1,091	2,249 <sup>h</sup>
	All	406 <sup>d</sup>	1,843 <sup>g</sup>	2,249	1,039 <sup>d</sup>	1,177 <sup>g</sup>	2,206
TP	1,800	698	2,599	3,296	759	1,826	2,585
	6,800	581	2,128	2,709	470	2,065	2,536
	7,800	642 <sup>i</sup>	1,983	2,625 <sup>j</sup>	402 <sup>i</sup>	1,904	2,306 <sup>j</sup>
	All	640	2,237	2,877 <sup>k</sup>	544	1,932	2,476 <sup>k</sup>

Columns labeled “Invest.” report average investment inefficiencies, calculated as  $2,500 - 100 \cdot I - I^2$ . Columns labeled “Bargain.” report average bargaining inefficiencies (due to delay and opting out), and columns labeled “Total” report the average overall inefficiencies. Superscript letters indicate significant differences at the 5% level (rank sum test). For each value of *w*, *n*=120

A final interesting observation that follows from Table 9 is that inefficiencies owing to delayed agreement and opting out are substantial. In all treatments, bargaining inefficiencies typically outweigh investment inefficiencies. Bargaining inefficiencies are smallest in the W-OO situation where the investment inefficiencies are the largest. This points to a potential trade-off between investment and bargaining inefficiency. Theoretically, W-OO should perform the worst because investment inefficiencies are predicted to be the largest. In practice, bargaining inefficiencies are particularly large in the other three situations considered, causing them to perform even worse than the W-OO case.

### 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we address the question whether the employer or the worker should make an investment in training that is specific in an economic sense. We consider a setting in which only the worker has alternative trading opportunities in the labor market. Depending on whether the market for alternative jobs operates frictionless (no friction case) or not (turnover costs case), bargaining between the employer and the worker is either modeled as a threat point game or as an outside option bargaining game. Theoretically, investment incentives are the same for the employer and the worker when the former case applies. If, however, the outside option bargaining game applies, then the employer is predicted to have the better investment incentives. He therefore should make the investment from an efficiency point of view.

By and large, our results are in line with these predictions. For the turnover costs case, we indeed observed that only when the outside wage of the worker is high, employers invest more than workers do. For the no-friction case, we obtain the opposite. There, workers invest more than employers do when the outside wage is high. Actual bargaining outcomes can provide a reasonable explanation for the observed differences between employers’ and workers’ investment levels. Only when the outside wage was low under the outside option game did the observed private returns on the investment made not justify the observed differences between



employers and workers. Overall, the observed inefficiencies are remarkably similar across the different situations considered. If anything, they suggest that the employer should make the investment in the turnover costs case, while the worker should invest when the no-friction case applies.

In our experiment, we consider one-sided investments only. Although, for our setup, standard theory predicts that allowing for two-sided investments would not improve investment incentives, it may still be the case that, in practice, efficiency is higher when the two parties can effectively share the costs of investment. It might therefore be interesting to experimentally investigate treatments with two-sided investments as well. This would also allow for a direct test of the theoretical prediction that (generically) only one party will actually invest (cf. Proposition 4 in Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b). In contrast to this prediction, one may reasonably expect that fairness considerations make the outcome in which the parties each invest half of the efficient level (and share the gross surplus equally) focal, especially when the outside wage is low.<sup>37</sup> Whether this is indeed the case is left for future research.

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## Appendix A: Learning effects

In each session, subjects played 18 times the two-stage game in Section 2. During the course of the experiment, they may have changed their behavior, for instance, because over time, they learned how to play the game. To make sure that our conclusions are not biased due to ignoring such learning effects, we consider in this appendix the data from the last nine and the final three periods separately as well. The focus is on investment levels (cf. Result 1 and Table 4) and on delay of agreement (cf. Result 3 and Table 7). Recall that, in the regressions reported in the main text that led to Results 2 and 4, we already control for potential learning effects.

The design of the experiment was such that the first and last nine periods included the same frequency of low, intermediate, and high levels of the worker's outside wage. Moreover, each value of  $w$  was represented exactly once in the final three periods. Tables 10 and 11 (investment levels and bargaining length, respectively) report the same statistics as in Tables 4 and 7, but now, also for the last nine and final three periods separately. The top panels of Tables 10 and 11 correspond exactly with the tables presented in the main text. The middle panels

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<sup>37</sup> Fehr et al. (2004) consider a setting in which paired subjects make *sequential* investment decisions. Before investments are made, subjects first bargain about the allocation of ownership (which in turn specifies how the returns to investments are shared). Under joint ownership, standard theory predicts no investments at all, whereas under single ownership, only the owner (which is the second investor in the experiment) is predicted to invest. In contrast to these predictions, Fehr et al. find that joint ownership is chosen most often and also that, under this ownership structure, typically both subjects invest. The latter can be explained by reciprocity; the second investor, on average, strongly reciprocates higher investments made by the first investor (although standard theory predicts that these investments are independent). This, in turn, makes it attractive for the first investor to invest under joint ownership. Note that, in contrast to our experiment, there is no ex post bargaining in these experiments.

**Table 10** Mean investment levels by treatment

	<i>w</i>	Employer invests			Worker invests		
		Mean	SD	Pred.	Mean	SD	Pred.
OO game {1–18}	1,800	38.7	(11.9)	[25]	28.0	(17.2)	[25]
	6,800	37.9 <sup>a</sup>	(13.3)	[36]	21.5 <sup>a</sup>	(15.5)	[0]
	7,800	40.0 <sup>b</sup>	(14.9)	[50]	21.9 <sup>b</sup>	(15.8)	[0]
	All	38.9 <sup>c</sup>	(9.0)	[37]	23.8 <sup>c</sup>	(14.5)	[8.3]
TP game {1–18}	1,800	29.9	(14.5)	[25]	30.9	(12.5)	[25]
	6,800	32.9	(12.6)	[25]	39.2	(15.5)	[25]
	7,800	32.5 <sup>d</sup>	(13.5)	[25]	43.5 <sup>d</sup>	(15.1)	[25]
	All	31.8	(12.7)	[25]	37.9	(13.3)	[25]
OO game {10–18}	1,800	33.8	(13.9)	[25]	25.7	(17.1)	[25]
	6,800	36.5 <sup>e</sup>	(14.0)	[36]	18.9 <sup>e</sup>	(17.0)	[0]
	7,800	40.3 <sup>f</sup>	(15.9)	[50]	19.7 <sup>f</sup>	(17.3)	[0]
	All	36.9 <sup>g</sup>	(9.1)	[37]	21.4 <sup>g</sup>	(15.9)	[8.3]
TP game {10–18}	1,800	28.7	(14.6)	[25]	29.4	(14.4)	[25]
	6,800	32.3	(17.2)	[25]	40.7	(15.8)	[25]
	7,800	31.0	(17.2)	[25]	41.0	(16.2)	[25]
	All	30.7	(15.4)	[25]	37.0	(14.4)	[25]
OO game {16–18}	1,800	34.9	(14.1)	[25]	24.6	(18.3)	[25]
	6,800	37.4 <sup>h</sup>	(13.3)	[36]	19.2 <sup>h</sup>	(17.5)	[0]
	7,800	42.4 <sup>i</sup>	(15.1)	[50]	20.1 <sup>i</sup>	(17.7)	[0]
	All	38.2 <sup>j</sup>	(9.1)	[37]	21.3 <sup>j</sup>	(16.7)	[8.3]
TP game {16–18}	1,800	29.7	(17.3)	[25]	30.3	(24.7)	[25]
	6,800	32.9	(23.3)	[25]	40.0	(17.5)	[25]
	7,800	29.7	(19.7)	[25]	41.5	(20.1)	[25]
	All	30.8	(17.9)	[25]	37.3	(18.2)	[25]

Superscript letters indicate significant differences at the 5% level (rank sum test;  $m=n=20$  individual investors). Standard deviations (SD) appear within parentheses, and theoretically predicted investment levels (Pred.) are within square brackets. Rows labeled “All” aggregate over the three different values of  $w$ . Periods considered are within curly brackets

only consider the data from the second half of the experiment, while the bottom panels only use the data from the final three periods.

Table 10 reports average investment levels by treatment. Statistical tests are again based on the average investment levels of individual investors. The results in the middle and bottom panels almost exactly reproduce the results of the top panel. The single difference is that no significant differences are found anymore under the TP game when  $w=7,800$ . This holds despite the fact that the mean levels over all investors are fairly far apart. Comparing for this particular case (i.e.,  $w=7,800$  under the TP game) the average investment levels across the different panels of Table 10 by means of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find no significant differences when the worker invests (the lowest  $p$  value is 0.304). For the case in which the employer invests, however, the top panel differs significantly from both the middle ( $p=0.047$ ) and bottom panels ( $p=0.032$ ). Over time, employers thus tend to invest less in this case, while workers do not change their investment behavior. Based on these

**Table 11** Percentage of immediate agreement and mean number of rounds before agreement

	<i>w</i>	Employer invests			Worker invests		
		% Imm.	# Rnds	<i>n</i>	% Imm.	# Rnds	<i>n</i>
OO game {1–18}	1,800	39.2	2.39 <sup>a</sup>	118	57.5	1.85 <sup>a</sup>	115
	6,800	51.7	1.60 <sup>b</sup>	101	72.5	1.27 <sup>b</sup>	105
	7,800	64.2	1.36 <sup>c</sup>	102	70.0	1.15 <sup>c</sup>	95
	All	51.7	1.82 <sup>d</sup>	321	66.7	1.44 <sup>d</sup>	315
TP game {1–18}	1,800	35.0	2.85 <sup>e</sup>	118	46.7	2.23 <sup>e</sup>	118
	6,800	40.0	2.44	118	35.0	2.34	118
	7,800	32.5	2.49	120	37.5	2.19	118
	All	35.8	2.59	356	39.7	2.25	354
OO game {10–18}	1,800	45.0	2.30	60	58.3	1.81	57
	6,800	56.7	1.65 <sup>f</sup>	54	80.0	1.13 <sup>f</sup>	53
	7,800	71.7	1.30 <sup>g</sup>	54	83.3	1.04 <sup>g</sup>	52
	All	57.8	1.77 <sup>h</sup>	168	73.9	1.34 <sup>h</sup>	62
TP game {10–18}	1,800	40.0	2.61 <sup>i</sup>	59	61.7	1.92 <sup>i</sup>	59
	6,800	38.3	2.33	60	31.7	2.42	59
	7,800	33.3	2.43	60	43.3	2.07	59
	All	37.2	2.46	179	45.6	2.14	177
OO game {16–18}	1,800	55.0	2.25	20	65.0	1.37	19
	6,800	50.0	1.94 <sup>j</sup>	18	85.0	1.11 <sup>j</sup>	18
	7,800	75.0	1.18	17	85.0	1.06	18
	All	60.0	1.82 <sup>k</sup>	55	78.3	1.18 <sup>k</sup>	55
TP game {16–18}	1,800	40.0	2.95	20	60.0	1.75	20
	6,800	30.0	2.45	20	20.0	2.3	20
	7,800	20.0	2.45	20	55.0	1.75	20
	All	30.0	2.62	60	45.0	1.93	60

Columns labeled “% Imm.” give the percentage of cases in which agreement is reached immediately. Columns labeled “# Rnds” report the mean number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement, and the columns labeled “*n*” report the number of observations on which these averages are based. Rows labeled “All” aggregate over the three different values of *w*. Superscript letters indicate significant differences at the 5% level (rank sum test). Periods considered are within curly brackets

learning effects, we still conclude that, under the TP game, workers invest more than employers do when the outside wage is high.<sup>38</sup>

As an additional test of learning effects, we regressed, for each of the 12 treatments, the investment levels on a variable that measures the time that the

<sup>38</sup> An explanation for why we do not get significant results (at the 5% level) in the middle and bottom panels is that the averages used there are based on fewer observations (three and one, respectively) and, thus, are more noisy. The reported standard deviations reflect this; in the middle and bottom panels, standard deviations are higher than in the top panel. Assume that each investor has a personal inclination for a certain behavior. Actual behavior is determined by this inclination and some “noise” or errors. The average behavior of the investor is an estimation of that individual inclination. More observations per individual means a better measurement of these inclinations and, hence, a better quality of the data used in the test. Although the test itself is independent of how many observations are included in the average, the power of the test increases if more data per individual are used.

investor was confronted with this particular value of the outside wage (besides a constant term). Only in two treatments did this time trend have a statistically significant (negative) coefficient: the case where  $w=1,800$  under E-OO and the case where  $w=6,800$  under W-OO. As can be seen from Table 10, however, the differences in overall mean investment levels for both these treatments in the three panels are small (and they display a nonmonotonic pattern). Taking all the above checks together, we conclude that Result 1 on investment behavior is not contaminated by learning effects.

Table 11 presents for each treatment the percentage of cases in which agreement is reached immediately and the average number of bargaining rounds before agreement is reached. Columns labeled “ $n$ ” give the number of observations on which the latter averages are based; observations in which one of the parties opted out (OO game) or no agreement was reached are left out. Comparing the middle with the top panel, it is observed that average delay is typically shorter in the second half than in the first half of the experiment. This follows because in almost all treatments, the average number of bargaining rounds before agreement is reached decreases when we take only the last nine periods into account (the two exceptions occur when  $w=6,800$  under E-OO and W-TP). Apparently, subjects learn to avoid costly delay when they play the game. Result 3 on delay of agreement is, however, not seriously affected by this. It is fully supported when we consider periods 10 to 18 only.<sup>39</sup> For the final three periods, the same types of differences are found, although not all of them are significant. Moreover, there we observed that overall agreement is reached sooner under the OO game when the worker invests. In case of the TP game, there are no significant differences, although when  $w=1,800$ , the overall observed mean bargaining length before agreement is substantially larger when the employer invests than when the worker invests, in line with Result 3(b).

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<sup>39</sup> The  $p$  value of the rank sum test comparing E-OO with W-OO for  $w=1,800$  equals  $p=0.060$ , which is close to significance at the 5% level.

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